

Remuneration report Clas Ohlson AB (publ), pertaining to 2024/2025 financial year (1 May 2024 – 30 April 2025)

Introduction

This report describes how the guidelines for remuneration of senior management of Clas Ohlson AB, adopted by the Annual General Meeting (AGM) held in September 2024, were implemented in the 2024/2025 financial year. The report also provides information about remuneration of the President and CEO Kristofer Tonström as well as a summary of the company's outstanding share-based and share price-based incentive programmes.

The report has been prepared in accordance with the Swedish Companies Act as well as the Stock Market Self-Regulation Committee's "Rules on Remuneration of the Board and Executive Management and on Incentive Programmes".

Further information on remuneration of senior management is available in Note 7 (Employees and employee costs) on pages 86-88 in the 2024/2025 Annual Report. Information on the work of the People Committee (Remuneration Committee) in 2024/2025 is set out in the corporate governance report available on pages 62-69 in the 2024/2025 Annual Report.

Director fees are not covered by this report. Such remuneration is resolved annually by the Annual General Meeting and disclosed in Note 7 on page 87 in the 2024/2025 Annual Report.

Key developments in 2024/2025

The CEO summarises the company's overall performance in his statement on pages 5-6 in the 2024/2025 Annual Report.

The company's remuneration guidelines: scope, purpose and deviations

These guidelines encompass the President and CEO and Clas Ohlson AB's Group Management. The overall objective of the company's guidelines for remuneration of senior management is to support Clas Ohlson's business strategy, the company's financial targets and safeguarding the company's long-term interests, including its sustainability. Clas Ohlson intends to offer remuneration levels that will attract, retain and motivate key individuals whose roles are important to achieve the company's overall objectives. These guidelines enable the company to offer senior management a competitive total remuneration.

Total remuneration is to be based on position and be attractive and competitive in the country of employment. The company believes that a balanced remuneration structure will provide senior management with the incentive to focus on creating long-term shareholder value, while the company will have the opportunity to offer cash incentives for the achievement of short-term performance objectives that contribute to the company's business strategy and the company's long-term interests. The total remuneration is to be market-based and may consist of: fixed annual basic salary, annual variable performance-based cash remuneration based on annual performance targets, pension and health benefits and other benefits that are common in the country of employment.

The guidelines are found on page 52 in the 2024/2025 Annual Report. Under the guidelines, the Board may temporarily resolve to derogate from the guidelines, in whole or in part, if in a specific case there is special cause for the derogation and a derogation is necessary to serve the company's long-term interests, including its sustainability, or to ensure the company's financial viability. No deviations from the guidelines have been decided in the 2024/2025 financial year and no derogations from the procedure for implementation of the guidelines have been made. The auditor's report regarding the company's compliance with the guidelines is available on <https://about.clasohlson.com/en/corporate-governance/>. No remuneration has been reclaimed. In addition to remuneration covered by the remuneration guidelines, the AGM of the company have resolved to implement long-term share-based incentive plans.

Table 1 – Total CEO remuneration in 2024/2025 (kSEK)

Name	Period	Fixed remuneration		Variable remuneration		Extraordinary items	Pension expense	Total remuneration	Proportion of fixed/variable remuneration, % *****
		Basic salary*	Other benefits**	One-year variable remuneration ***	Multi-year variable remuneration**				
Kristofer Tonström	1 May 2024–30 Apr 2025	9,436	107	5,250	3,988	0	2,629	21,240	57/43

* Remuneration for period stated above

** Benefits comprising company car, fuel, congestion charge, health insurance

*** Short-term incentive plan calculated using rounded months

**** A description of applicable multi-year variable remuneration is provided under the heading Summary of the long-term incentive programme (CEO)

***** Fixed salary (basic salary, other benefits, pension), variable salary (annual, multi-year remuneration, extraordinary items, no pension provisions on variable salary)

Share-based remuneration

Outstanding share-based and share price-based incentive plans 2024/2025

Long-term incentives (“LTI”)

The aim of LTI programmes is to create the prerequisites for retaining and recruiting competent employees to the Group. The programmes were designed to encourage participants to become shareholders in the company, which is expected to have a positive impact on their long-term work performance. Connecting participants’ rewards to the company’s profit and value development will continue to promote company loyalty and thus sustainable value growth in the company.

Long-term incentive programmes that entitle employees to acquire shares are subject to AGM approval. The performance period for LTI 2022, LTI 2023 and LTI 2024 were in effect during the financial year. All long-term incentive programmes encompass performance shares.

All ongoing long-term incentive programmes have been approved by the AGM. The current programme covers up to 50 senior executives and other individuals deemed to be able to influence Clas Ohlson’s development in the long-term.

Structure of long-term incentive programmes

All participants of the LTI receive one performance share award free of charge that provides the participant the opportunity to be allotted a number of series B shares in Clas Ohlson, provided that the performance conditions of the LTI determined by the Board have been fulfilled. The value of the underlying shares offered when granted a performance share award will be 45 per cent (LTI 2024 45-60 per cent) of the individual fixed annual gross basic salary. The amount is divided by the share price at the start of the programme to calculate the number of underlying shares for each participant. The participants comprise senior management and key individuals. Any allotment of performance shares will take place after the end of a three-year vesting period provided that the participant has been a permanent employee for the entire vesting period and the predetermined performance targets have been achieved.

The assessment of the outcome of the performance conditions is split as follows: net sales (30 per cent), earnings per share (40 per cent) and sustainability (30 per cent). The outcome for each performance condition will be determined individually. This means that not all performance conditions need to be met in order for the Performance Shares to be allotted. Minimum and maximum levels are set for each performance condition. If the minimum level is achieved, 30 per cent allotment related to the performance condition will take place. If the maximum level is achieved or exceeded, the maximum allotment related to the performance condition will take place. If the outcome is between the minimum and maximum levels, straight-line allotment takes place and no allotment takes place if the minimum level is

achieved. The number of performance shares that can be allotted for each share right will be adjusted for any dividends made during the period from the determination of the opening value up until the date of the allotment of the performance shares after the end of the vesting period.

LTI 2022

The performance periods for the LTI 2022 long-term incentive programme runs from 1 May 2022 until 30 April 2025. Any allotment of performance shares will take place after the end of a three-year vesting period provided that the participant has been a permanent employee for the entire vesting period and the predetermined performance targets have been achieved.

LTI 2023

The performance periods for the LTI 2023 long-term incentive programme runs from 1 May 2023 until 30 April 2026. Any allotment of performance shares will take place after the end of a three-year vesting period provided that the participant has been a permanent employee for the entire vesting period and the predetermined performance targets have been achieved.

LTI 2024

The performance periods for the LTI 2024 long-term incentive programme runs from 1 May 2024 until 30 April 2027. Any allotment of performance shares will take place after the end of a three-year vesting period provided that the participant has been a permanent employee for the entire vesting period and the predetermined performance targets have been achieved.

The above programmes are described in more detail in Note 7 of the Annual Report.

Summary of the long-term incentive programme (CEO)

The following summary is of the long-term incentive programmes that ran during the 2024/2025 financial year.

During the 2024/2025 financial year, President and CEO Kristofer Tonström was included in LTI 2022, LTI 2023 and LTI 2024. During the financial year, Kristofer Tonström received one performance share award ("**LTI award**"), which offers him the opportunity to be allotted, free of charge, a number of series B shares in Clas Ohlson. The value of the underlying shares offered when granted the LTI right will be 45 per cent of his fixed annual gross basic salary at the start of each program (60 per cent for LTI 2024). LTI 2021 concluded at the end of the financial year 2023/2024, and the outcome is reported under multi-year variable remuneration in Table 1. The performance period regarding LTI 2022 concluded at the end of the financial year 2024/2025, and LTI 2023 and LTI 2024 are ongoing. Therefore, no performance shares were allotted under LTI 2022, LTI 2023 or LTI 2024 during the financial year, which is why there is no presentation of the outcome for multi-year variable remuneration in Table 1.

Application of performance criteria

The performance measures for the CEO's variable remuneration have been selected to deliver the company's strategy and to encourage behaviour which is in the long-term interest of the company. In the selection of performance measures, the strategic objectives and short-term and long-term business priorities have been taken into account. The non-financial performance measures further contribute to alignment with the company's strategic and sustainability targets as well as the company values.

Short Term Incentive, STI

In addition to basic salary, senior management are to qualify for STI for performance that exceeds one or several predetermined performance levels during a financial year, designed to promote the company's long-term value creation. Clearly defined performance targets are to be decided annually by the Board or by individuals elected by the Board. The performance targets may be connected to operational, financial or personal results. Remuneration from the STI programme is subject to a ceiling, which means that Clas Ohlson AB can calculate maximum remuneration levels from the beginning. Insofar as performance does not match the lowest performance level, no STI will be paid. STI will depend on the position held and may not exceed 60 per cent of the total annual fixed basic salary if the ceiling is achieved, which also represents the maximum outcome of STI.

Table 2 – Performance of the CEO in the reported financial year: Short Term Incentive

Name	Description of performance criteria	Weighting of performance criteria	a. Target achieved b. Total outcome
Kristofer Tonström	EBIT (MSEK) pre IFRS 16 Adjustment	40%	a. MSEK 1,095 b. kSEK 2,100
	Total Organic Growth (percent) in local currencies	30%	a. 10 % b. kSEK 1,575
Kristofer Tonström	Qualitative target; (scale 1–5) Individual total performance including: (i) Successful partial delivery of ERP/POS digital transformation – 100% delivery corresponding to a 5 (ii) Delivering on key initiatives in business plan 24/25	30%	a. Equivalent to 5 b. kSEK 1,575
Total outcome STI			
Kristofer Tonström			kSEK 5,250

Comparative information on the change of remuneration and company performance

Table 3 – Change of remuneration and company performance over the last five reported financial years (RFY) (kSEK) (excl. members of Group Management)

	2020/2021 vs 2019/2020	2021/2022 vs 2020/2021	2022/2023 vs 2021/2022	2023/2024 vs 2022/2023	2024/2025 vs 2023/2024	2024/2025
CEO remuneration	-804 (+7%)	+862 (-7%)	-1,019 (-9%)	3,923 (+38%)	6,010 (+51%)	21,240
Group operating profit	+84,000 (+19%)	+104,100 (+19%)	-336,900 (-52%)	+412,000 (+135%)	+454,000 (+63%)	1,171,000
Average remuneration on a full-time equivalent basis of employees* of the Parent Company	-24.97 (-4.5%)	-2.90 (-0.5%)	-33.5 (-6.4%)	+57.21 (+11.6%)	+23.89 (+4.3%)	573

* Excluding members of Group Management